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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
MATHEW J. McCORMICK, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF 
AMERICA, a corporation, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 8593 
Appeal from the District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah 
Martin M. Larson, Judge 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The statement of facts made by appellant in its brief is 
so incomplete, and inaccurate in many respects, that the court 
cannot properly understand or adjudicate the issues involved 
without a more complete statement. 
This is an action to recover for commissions on the sale 
of defendant's stock under a written contract (Ex. 13). The 
trial court held that defendant could not be required to pay 
20% commissions as the contract provided, but plaintiff could 
recover 15% and that defendant could not recover back any 
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amounts paid at the 20% rate (Finding No. 15, R. 44, Con-
clusion No. 3, R. 46). 
Defendant appealed on the theory that certain testimony 
was erroneously stricken, said testimony being offered in 
alleged support of defendant's theory that it could set off the 
5% purportedly overpa~d to plaintiff against the amount due 
(Appellant's brief, Point I-A) and that commissions were 
erroneously allowed on a part of the transactions involved. 
Respondent respectfully asks the court to consider Point IV 
of this· brief to the effect that commissions should have been 
awarded at the 20% rate on all transactions. Some amplification 
of the facts is required to present the legal problems in their 
context. 
On September 25, 1952, Life Insurance Corporation of 
America filed an application with the Utah State Securities 
Commission for authority to offer for sale 20,000 shares of 
capital stock of the par value of $10.00 per share for a price 
of $20.00 per share. It represented that commissions would be 
paid at the rate of 20% on the stock sold and that it planned 
on using a trust agreement with respect to the sale of said 
shares (Ex. 5). The defendant did not file any application for 
a solicitation permit, it being the opinion of the insurance com· 
missioner of the state of Utah that a conversion of a company 
fnHn a tnutual benefit company to a stock company did notre-
quire a solicitation permit under the Insurance Code but that 
rcgistr4ttion \\'as required under the Securities Code (Ex. 4). 
;\n a~rccrncnt w~ts executed with Utah Savings and Trust Com· 
~ 
panr pro\'iding in substance that all cash received from pur· 
chasers l )f stock in connection "rith the proposed sale thereof 
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in the defendant company would be deposited in escrow with 
the bank until there was on deposit the sum of $200,000.00. 
If that amount was not on deposit within the time provided 
in the agreement, all of the purchasers of stock would be 
entitled to have their money refunded to them (Ex. 10). A copy 
of the said agreement was filed with the State Securities Com-
mission (R. 108-109). 
In September, 1952, Cleo H. Bullard, the president, and 
Harry Pugsley, counsel, both being directors of the defendant 
company, conferred in San Francisco with the plaintiff about 
: the possibility of his accepting an offer to sell the stock of the 
. defendant company on a commission basis. Defendant also 
conferred with Ashby D. Thatcher, executive vice president 
and a director of the defendant company. Mr. McCormick has 
~never had any legal training (R. 23 5) and prior to his time 
:of conversation with defendant's officers and directors he had 
-never had any occasion to examine the laws of the state of 
:~Utah with respect to insurance matters (R. 235). His experi-
ence with organization of life insurance companies had been 
;::very limited (R. 236). Particularly he had not had any occasion 
~to look into the laws of the state of Utah for any rulings of 
:--the Insurance Commissioner with respect to requirements 
;;incident to the issuance of solicitation permits (R. 236). 
Mr. McCormick's first conversation with Ashby D. Thatcher 
:;was in San Francisco between the 1st and lOth of September, 
. 1952 (R. 237). Mr. Thatcher was introduced as an authority 
>on insurance and it was represented that he had been the exam-
~)ner for the state of Utah and other states for many years. Mr. 
,, Thatcher stated directly that he was executive vice president 
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of the defendant and a director and that he was instrumental 
in organizing the company; that he had been an examiner for 
the states of Utah, Nevada and other states (R. 237). Mr. 
Thatcher stated that the company could and would pay plain-
tiff 20% commissions on the $400,000.00 worth of stock being 
offered for sale (R. 239). 
A similar conversation was had with Cleo H. Bullard in 
San Francisco a few days after plaintiff's conversation with 
Mr. Thatcher (R. 239-240). Mr. Bullard was president of the 
defendant company and represented that he had had a great 
amount of experience and made a great study with respect to 
insurance laws. Mr. Bullard explained his experience in the 
insurance business generally and with respect to the Utah in-
surance commission requirements and stated that the defendant 
had employed an attorney of outstanding experience who was 
formerly connected with the Attorney General's office and 
was nvery competent as an insurance attorney." Mr. Bullard 
represented that the company could pay to Mr. McCormick 
20% commission on sales (R. 240-241). 
Harry D. Pugsley, legal counsel and a director of the 
defendant company, represented to Mr. McCormick in San 
Francisco prior to the execution of the contract that he had i 
formerly been connected with the Attorney General's office 
and c chad a vast an1ount of experience as an insurance attor· ' 
ney... l\lr. Pugsley assured the plaintiff that the defendant 
could pay 20~r commission to him on stock sales and that he 
\vould dr~n\' a contract to that effect (R. 243). 
T\1 r. !\ t c( ~nnnick relied on the statements of lvir. Thatcher, 
Mr. Bullard ~tnd 1\lr. Pugsley that the company could and 
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would pay 20% commission. On reliance of their representa-
tions, he executed the contract in evidence here as Exhibit 13, 
moved to Salt Lake City, and commenced performance under 
the contract. In December, 1952, an amendment to Exhibit 13 
was executed by the parties and it is in evidence as page 4 of 
that exhibit. 
The agreement between the parties provides in substance 
that the plaintiff has the exclusive right to the sale of the 
stock of the defendant for eighteen months (Ex. 13, para. 5); 
that he will receive a commission of 20% on the total amount 
of sales procurred by him, such amounts to be based upon 
ctthe bankable receipts delivered by said McCormick to insur-
ance company in the form of cash, negotiable checks, promis-
sory notes or collateral that have been prior approved by in-
surance company and which notes or collateral are acceptable 
to established banking institutions in Salt Lake City, Utah" 
(Ex. 13, para. 4). Defendant agreed to pay said amounts 
within ten days after receipt of the same and in the event of 
checks, after they had cleared the bank (ibid) . The contract 
provides that the defendant would exercise reasonable efforts 
in furthering the sale of stock, procurement of subscriptions and 
!twill cooperate with McCormick in all reasonable matters and 
assist him in his work" (Ex. 13, para. 7). The contract also 
provided that ((in the event that it becomes necessary for action 
to be brought to enforce any of the terms, obligations set forth 
herein, the defaulting party agrees to pay all costs of court 
including reasonable attorneys' fees (Ex. 13, para. 11). 
The trial court found that plaintiff substantially performed 
his contract with defendant and accounted to defendant for 
all stock sold (Findings 18 and 19, R. 45). 
5 
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During the period of time covered by plaintiff's contract, 
13,794 shares of defendant's stock were sold. These trans-
actions are summarized in Schedule I attached to the findings 
and conclusions of the trial court (R. 49-57). The defendant 
received in payment for these shares $142,729.86 in cash , 
$32,961.71 in ordinary negotiable notes (referred to by de- ' 
fendant and sometimes in this brief as personal notes, see 
Point I-B of this brief, infra); $41,180.00 in real estate mort-
gages and contracts (see Point I -C of this brief, infra), and 
$91,646.08 in so-called ((subscription notes", of which 
$59,008.43 remained unpaid at the ~e of their cancellation 
(see Point 1-D infra). 
On June 22, 195 3, the defendant wrote a letter in evi-
dence as plaintiff's Exhibit 19 to the State Insurance Commis-
sioner enclosing a purported audit report by the accounting 
firm of Birrell, McGee, Zimmerman and Thomas in which the 
representation was made in substance that the company had 
sufficient assets to satisfy the requirements of the escrow 
agreement (Ex. 10) and that the company had sufficient assets 
to satisfy the requirements of the Insurance Code. Many of 
these assets consisted of notes and mortgages given to the 
company in payment for shares of stock. Based upon this letter 
from the con1pany, the Insurance Commissioner, on July 7, 
1953, authorized Utah Savings Bank and Trust Company to 
release to the company all of the funds held by the bank in 
escrow under the agreement (Ex. 19). The assets reported to 
the Insurance Commissioner were carried by the defendant on 
its books until son1etin1e in approximately February or March, 
1954. At that tin1e, acting upon the recon1mendation of Robert 
L. l\.fcGee ,an accountant, the defendant arbitrarily cancelled 
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the obligations of all of the persons who had agreed to pay, 
and in most instances were in fact paying for the shares of stock 
in defendant. 
The trial court found that c (various of the conventional 
(personal notes) as detailed in Column 5 of the aforesaid 
Schedule I and various of the real estate mortgages and con-
tracts as detailed in Column 7 of Schedule I and all of the 
subscription notes as detailed in Column 8 of Schedule I were 
cancelled by the defendant during the month of February and 
March, 1954, and defendant made no attempt to enforce the 
provisions of said agreements nor was plaintiff given an oppor-
tunity to enforce them." (Finding of Fact No. 10, R. 42.) 
All the amounts payable to the defendant from the purchasers 
of defendant's stock were cancelled at that time, whether the 
form of the promise to pay was a note with a real estate mort-
gage or real estate contract which had been assigned to de-
fendant as security, a conventional type negotiable promissory 
note or a so-called subscription note (see testimony of Robert 
L. McGee, R. 299-306 and see Exhibits 42 and 53). The court 
found nThe circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the 
various obligations to pay the defendant for the stock . . . 
compel the court to find specifically that the said cancellations 
were not in good faith toward plaintiff and that said cancel-
lations were made in bad faith so that the principle stated by 
the Restatement on Agency, Vol. 2, Sec. 454, is applicable." 
(Finding 13, R. 44.) 
Said finding is not challenged by appellant here. 
Defendant issued stock to subscribers for the amounts paid. 
, (There is no dispute on this point, it is admitted in appellanfs 
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brief, p. 9). Between the time of the purported ((cancellation," 
(February and March, 1954, R. 42), and the stockholders' 
meeting, May 10, 1954 (R. 71, 72), defendant issued stock 
to and collected payments from 3 2 of the identical persons 
whose obligations were ( (cancelled." This figure can be sub-
stantiated by comparing defendant's stockbook (Ex. 22) and 
stock ledger (Ex. 23) with the cancellations. 
Plaintiff had been paid commissions in the amount of 
$24,720.00 for stock sold by him at the rate of 20%. The trial 
court held that said amount ((includes all charges properly 
made against plaintiff during the term of the aforesaid agree-
ment between the parties" (R. 44, Finding No. 15). The trial 
court held that Sec. 31-16-17 of the Utah Code Annotated 
' 
1953, prevents the plaintiff from recovering any amount in 
excess of 15% of the amount of stock sales upon which 
plaintiff had not received any commissions, said amount being 
$152,290.00 (R. 44-45). The court held, however, that the 
defendant could not use any amounts paid at the rate of 20% 
as a credit on the 15% 'vhich the trial court held was lawfully 
due to plaintiff. In other words defendant could not recover 
back any commissions paid in excess of the amount allowed 
in the statute (R. 44-45). The $24,720.00 charged to plaintiff 
includes all promotion and organization expense such as filing 
fees, license fees for plaintiff and plaintiffs salesmen and 
iterns of that kind (R. 561-367). The trial court held that the 
defendant could not charge against plaintiff the defendant's 
"estimate" of general adn1inistrative expenses (R. 369-370). 
l~he (l1U rt held that the defendant nhad a duty tO plaintiff 
t() attcrnpt in good faith to enforce said notes, mortgages and 
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real estate contracts according to the terms and prov1s1ons 
thereof so that the plaintiff could receive his lawful share of 
the cash which the defendant company was entitled to receive 
pursuant to the provisions of all of said instruments. Cancel-
lation of all of said notes, subscription notes, mortgages and 
contracts as were cancelled by the defendant without giving 
plaintiff an opportunity to collect or enforce them was a vio-
lation of the duty which the defendant owed to plaintiff and 
effectively precluded plaintiff from obtaining the amount of 
cash as commissions to which he was entitled pursuant to law 
as a result of the contract with the defendant company" 
(Finding No. 10, R. 42). 
The appellant does not challenge any of the findings of 
the trial court on the material facts. Much of the evidence in 
the trial court was tabulated from the evidence, and summar-
ized by schedules and nearly every point of fact was disputed. 
The respondent takes the position in this brief that the 
rulings of the trial court were not prejudicial to appellant in 
any manner and that the matters complained of by the appel-
lant in this court are, for the most part, immaterial and col-
lateral points in any event. The respondent respectfully asks 
the court to consider the respondent's position to the effect 
that the trial court erred in failing to allow the plaintiff a full 
20% commission as provided by the contract under the theory 
argued in Point IV of this brief. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
ASSUMING TI-IAT COMMISSIONS WERE PAYABLE 
TO PLAINTIFF ((AS AND WHEN RECEIVED" BY DE-
FENDANT, AS DEFENDANT CLAIMS, DEFENDANT'S 
CANCELLATION OF THE OBLIGATIONS BY PURCHAS-
ERS OF STOCK CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF THE 
DUTY DEFENDANT OWED TO PLAINTIFF TO EN-
FORCE THE PROVISIONS OF THE INSTRUMENTS 
WHICH DEFENDANT ACCEPTED. 
Defendant implies in Point I and particularly Point I(b) 
of its brief that the only obligations which it cancelled were 
personal notes and so-called subscription notes (Brief 7). 
Defendant states that plaintiff received commissions on the 
cash receipts and real estate contracts to the date of the ter-
mination of plaintiff's agreement (Appellant's Brief pg. 6-7). 
Neither of these statements is true. Cash receipts were in the 
amount of $142,792.86 (R. 41, Findings of Fact No. 7). 
Defendant Company received and accepted real estate con-
tracts and mortgages from purchasers of stock of the value 
after discounts in the amount of $41,180.00 (R. 41). The 
total of these figures is $183,792.86. If plaintiff had been paid 
cornmissions at the rate of 20% on these sales, as stated by 
defendant, he would have received $36,794.57. In fact here-
ceived $24,720.00, including all charges properly made against 
plaintiff during the tern1 of the agreement between the parties 
(R .. fl, Findings of Fact No. 15). 
Appellant's n1isstatement goes farther than that. Not only 
10 
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were personal (conventional, negotiable) notes and so-called 
subscription notes cancelled in January and February, 1954, 
but defendant cancelled all amounts payable to the defendan~ 
from purchasers of defendant's stock whether the form of the 
promise to pay was a note with a real estate mortgage which 
had been assigned to the defendant, a conventional type nego-
tiable promissory note or a so-called subscription note. (See the 
testimony of Robert L. McGhee, R. 299-306, Exs. 42 and 53. 
In Exhibit 39, Schedule 6, defendant admits that real estate 
contracts and negotiable notes were arbitrarily reclassified as 
{(subscription notes.") After cancellation of all of these in-
struments the defendant refused to pay commissions to plaintiff 
on the amounts that were then due on the various obigations 
on the theory that defendant was liable to plaintiff only for 
cash ((as and when received" by defendant from stock pur-
chasers. The trial court held that while Section 31-6-7 U.S.C. 
. ' 
195 3 was a condition of plaintiff's contract so that commis-
sions were payable only on ful)ds ((as and when received", the 
cancellation of all of the agreements of the purchasers to pay 
defendant money for stock effectively deprived plaintiff of his 
commission. The court held that the defendant could not itself 
complain of the failure to satisfy the condition precedent when 
defendant's own action prevented the condition from occur-
ring. In other words, the court held that the defendant could 
not by its own act make impossible the performance of the 
condition precedent upon which it is liable to plaintiff de-
pended and then defeat plaintiff's claims for collections on 
the ground that the condition had not been satisfied. In order 
to properly fit defendant's arguments on appeal into the 
context of the lawsuit it is necessary to consider this basic law 
11 
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of the case as applied to the vartous classes of instruments 
which defendant cancelled. 
A. Defendant had a duty to plaintiff to enforce the pro-
visions of all of the instruments secured and unsecured which 
defendant accepted from purchasers of stock in connection with 
stock purchase transactions. 
The trial court found in its Finding No. 5 (R. 40, 41) 
that Schedule 1 attached to the findings (R. 49-57) contained 
an accurate and complete statement of the shares issued and 
purchased or contracted for and the consideration received 
therefor during the period of time covered by the plaintiff's 
agreement. In its Finding No. 10 the trial court found, and it 
is undisputed in the evidence, that various of the conventional 
notes, various of the real estate mortgages and contracts as 
detailed in Column 7 of Schedule 1 and all of the subscription 
notes as detailed in Column 8 were cancelled by the defendant 
during the months of February and March, 1954, Hand defend-
ant made no attempt to enforce the provisions of said agree-
tnents, nor was plaintiff given an opportunity to enforce them. 
The defendant had a duty to plaintiff to attempt in good faith 
to enforce said notes, mortgages and real estate contracts ac-
cording to the terms and provisions thereof so that the plaintiff 
could receive his la \Yful shares of the cash which the defendant 
company \vas entitled to receive pursuant to the provisions 
of all of the said instruments. Cancellation of the said notes, 
subscription notes, mortgages and contracts as "rere cancelled 
by the defendant \\·ithout giving plaintiff an opportunity to 
coll('Ct or enforce them \vas the violation of the duty which 
the defendant O\Yed to plaintiff and effectively precluded 
12 
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plaintiff from obtaining the amount of cash as commissions to 
which he was entitled pursuant to law as a result of the con-
tract with defendant company." (R. 42.) It is to be observed, 
parenthetically, that the defendant and appellant does not 
challenge on this appeal the Finding of Fact or the Conclusions 
of Law comparable thereto (Conclusions No. 5 and 6, R. 46, 
47). 
Nor can the correctness of the principle be doubted. It is 
stated by Williston on his work on contracts as follows: 
((It is a principle of fundamental justice that if a 
promissor is himself the cause of failure of perform-
ance, either of an obligation due him or of a condition 
upon which his own liability depends, he cannot take 
advantage of the failure." (Williston on Contracts, 
Vol. III, Sec. 677, p. 1952). 
The principle is universal. It has been applied in several 
cases in point where the contract itself provided that an agent 
or broker was to obtain commissions etas and when" moneys 
were received, or contained language of substantially similar 
meaning. The apparent leading case in Utah also involved 
an obligation to pay on notes accepted by a life insurance 
company. 
In Reed v. Union Cert. Life Ins. Co. of Cincinnati, (1900) 
21 Ut. 295, 61 P. 21, plaintiff's agreement with defendant life 
insurance company provided that plaintiff would be paid when 
cash was paid to defendant upon the premium procurred by 
plaintiff. Defendant accepted notes from one Beck, as pay-
ment on premiums and then cancelled the notes. The court 
held that plaintiff could recover his commission: 
13 
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((The facts show that plaintiff had performed his 
part of the contract, and obtained an application for 
insurance that was satisfactory to the defendant; that, 
af~er .full examin~tion, defen~ant acc~pted Beck's ap-
phcatlon, and dehvered a pohcy to hun and gave its 
receipt in full payment of the first year's premium. 
Having accepted the Beck notes} a legal obligation, as 
between tbe defendant and the plaintiff} rested upon 
the defendant to collect the notes when they became 
due} and out of the proceeds when they became due, 
and out of the proceeds thereof pay the agreed com-
mission. * * * The company could not thus (by sur-
rendering the notes) relieve itself from such liability 
to the plaintiff for the commission earned by volun-
tarily placing beyond its power the right to collect the 
cash on the unmatured notes, because it had purchased 
the policy, and in part consideration thereof had sur-
rendered the notes out of which the commissions should 
have been paid. * * * Having sold them to Beck, it is 
estopped from denying liability on the contract simply 
because it refused to collect the cash on the notes, as 
it should have done, or should have attempted to do, 
unless excused from that duty by the plaintiff. By re-
ceiving back the policy, the defendant may have received 
a full equivalent for the notes. The contract does not 
provide that the defendant, after having accepted the 
risk shall have the right to buy a surrender of the policy, 
and thereby relieve itself from its duty to collect the 
notes in payment of the premiums. A principal who 
agrees that his agent shall receive a percentage of 
1nonev or connniJsions to be paid upon a contract se-
c/Ired. through Jucb age11t fo,· the benefit of both cannot 
dispose of his ou·n rigbt to receil'e the fund, and thus 
dcpriz·e tbe "gent of the reu·(1rd for his Jerl'i:·eJ. Other-
u·iJc tbc princi p.d 11zight receiz·e a full equtvalent for 
tbc or,;,_[!,illdl fruits of the ttgent'J labor, and yet not pay 
/1i111 a dollt~r. T/1c princip(tl ct~nnot do this u)ithout the 
14 
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agent's express consent} and in this case the evidence 
does not show that consent was given. 
((The defendant voluntarily placed itself in a posi-
tion whereby it had no power to collect the notes, as 
it was in duty bound to do or endeavor to do, and there-
fore, it cannot now be heard to say that the maker was 
insolvent when the notes were surrendered." (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
The rulings on similar factual situations unanimously 
reach similar conclusions. 
In Jordan v. Busch} et al. ( App. Ct. of Ill. 3rd Div., 1936) 
1 N.E. (2d) 745, the plaintiff performed services for the 
defendant in connection with a proposed organization of the 
Rock Island Brewing Company. The agreement between plain-
tiff and defendants provided, among other things, that the 
payment to the plaintiff was to be made only from the salaries 
and dividends received by the defendants on their interest in 
the brewery property in Rock Island, Illinois. Plaintiff per-
formed his contract but the defendants traded and sold their 
securities in the corporation and then claimed that they did not 
owe anything to the plaintiff. They contended the contract 
was not an absolute agreement to be paid but an agreement 
to pay out of a particular fund, namely, salaries and dividends; 
therefore, they were only indebted to plaintiff in the amount 
of some $409.70 because of the alleged impossibility of re-
ceiving further salary or dividends as provided in the agreement. 
Plaintiff, however, took the position that when the defendants 
disposed of their interest in the corporation they, in effect, 
alienated the sources of funds fron1 which the payments were 
to be made and that by their own conduct made impossible the 
performance of the conditions precedent upon which their 
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liability by the terms of the agreement was 1nade to depend. 
The court said: 
((The rule of law is that when a party agrees to pay 
out money from a fund which is derived only from a 
certain source, this condition is for the benefit of the 
promissor, and, if he alienates the source of that fund, 
he cannot escape liability. It is a principle of funda-
mental justice that if a promissor himself is the cause 
of a failure of performance either of an obligation 
due him or of a condition upon which his own liability 
depends, he cannot take advantage of the failure. One 
who agrees to _pay for goods on delivery cannot set up 
the lack of dehvery when caused by his own act. Willis-
ton on Contracts, Vol. II, Sec. 677. In St. Louis Beef 
Co. v. Casualty Co., 201 U. S. 173, 26 S. Ct. 400, 50 
L.Ed. 712, the court said: (In general, when one party, 
by his fault presents the other party to a contract from 
entitling himself to a benefit under it according to its 
terms, the former is liable for the value of that benefit, 
less the value or cost of what the plaintiff would have 
had to do to get it.' . . . 
t(In City of Chicago v. People ex rel. Norton 56 
Ill. 327, at page 333, the court said: ulf a person prom-
ise to pay a sum of money when he shall collect his de-
?nands of anothe,-~ then if it appear that he had no 
denzands, or if he haz·e and fail to use due diligence 
to collect the111, in eithe1· case the pro1nise nzay be en-
forced as absolute.' ... 
nit seems clear that \Yhere a contract is made which 
is performable at the tin1e of the occurrence of a future 
event, the la'v imputes to the promisor an agreement 
that he '"ill put no obstacle in the \Yay of the happen-
ing of that event, and that he will hold himself in 
rc~tdiness to co-operate \vhere his co-operation is a neces-
sn ry element. If, in violation of this implied covenant 
on his part, he does something \vhich prevents the hap· 
pening of the event, the contract becomes absolute and 
16 
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must be performed as though the event had occurred. 
Marvin v. Rodgers, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 423, 115 S.W. 
863, 865. 
t(W e are of the opinion that the payments under the 
contract became due upon the sale by the defendants 
of their stock in the company and the surrendering of 
their control of the same, and we are further of the 
opinion that the amount of damages found to be due 
and owing to plaintiff was correct! y decided by the 
trial court." (Emphasis supplied.) 
A similar case is Hayes v. Beyer (Mich. 1938) 278 N. W. 
764, 284 Mich. 60. In this case the defendant agreed to pay to 
plaintiff the commission in the event of the sale of a certain 
tract of land. The buyer had agreed to pay a certain portion 
of the purchase price to the seller in the future, and the agree-
ment between the plaintiff and defendant provided that the 
defendant was to pay to plaintiff his commission 
tt ••• as and provided said payments (from the pur-
chaser) are made to me, and only in case said payments 
are paid to me, until said Bertha Hayes shall have re-
ceived $2182.50, which amount is the balance due 
under this agreement ... '' 
About a year later the defendant took the property back 
from the purchaser and the trial court held that it appeared 
that the defendant had repurchased the land from the pur-
chaser and placed beyond the purchaser his duty to make 
the payments due under the contract so that the contract of 
the plaintiff could be carried out when the payments were 
received under the land contract. Judgment for plaintiff was 
vigorously affirmed. 
((In 13 C.J. p. 658, Sec. 722, the rule is well stated: 
(Where a contract is performable on the occurrence 
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of a future event, there is an implied agreement that 
the promisor will place no obstacle in the way of the 
happening of such event, particularly where it is de-
pendent in whole or in part on his own act; and where 
he prevents the fulfillment of a condition precedent or 
its performance by the adverse party, he cannot rely 
on such condition to defeat his liability. * * * Hence, 
the performance of a condition precedent is discharged 
or excused, and the conditional promise made an abso-
lute one, where the promisor himself * * * waives the 
performance.' . . ." (Citing many cases.) 
In Walker v. Chancey (Sup. Ct. Florida 1928) 117 S. 
705, the defendant entered into a contract with the plaintiff 
whereby defendant agreed to pay plaintiff a commission of 
ten per cent on the sale price of certain real estate ((payable 
out of the first cash payment." Defendant entered into a 
contract with a W. M. Toomer to sell the tract of land. The 
defendant subsequently was offered a higher price than Toomer 
agreed to pay, so he refused to perform his Toomer contract 
and prevented Toomer from making any further payments as 
stipulated in that agreement. 
The court held that the defendant obligated himself in 
his agreement with the plaintiff to pay the commission and 
that he could not evade liability by making the fulfillment of 
the condition precedent impossible by failing to perform on 
the Toomer contract. The court ruled: 
'(The rule as stated in 6 R.C.L. 945 is as follows: 
n ~However, one \Yho prevents or makes impossible 
the perforn1ance or happening of a condition preceden~, 
upon \vhich his liability, by the terms of a contract, ts 
made to depend, cannot aYail himself of its non-per· 
fl)rn1ance. Likewise, \vhere the promise is to pay out 
of a fund to be realized in a certain \Yay, there is an 
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implied obligation to use reasonable diligence in per-
forming the act upon which payment is contingent. In 
default of such diligence, payment becomes due with-
out performance of the condition.' 
((The agreement to pay the commission is a distinct 
obligation. The agreement that the commission should 
be paid out of a certain fund is another obligation and 
this latter obligation may be dispensed with or made 
inapplicable by the conduct of the obligor." 
The court cites with approval cases from Florida, Ken-
tucky, California, New York, Iowa, Washington, Alabama 
and the United States Supreme Court. 
In 17 C.J.S. Contracts, Sec. 468, particularly Sub-section 
(b), the law is summarized as follows (pp. 969, 970) : 
((For example, in the case of a promise to pay when 
the promissor collects certain moneys, there is an im-
plied promise that the promissor will use diligence to 
make such collection. The same rule applies where he 
has waived performance of a condition precedent.'' 
The ensuing subsections of this point demonstrate how 
defendant similar! y violated its duty to plaintiff in the case 
at bar. 
B. Commissions are payable on conventional type nego-
tiable notes accepted by defendant. 
Appellant admits in its brief (Appellant's brief, p. 7) that 
in February or March 1954, it cancelled all of the instruments 
identified in Column 5 of Schedule 1 (R. 49-57). The trial 
court made the following finding concerning said notes: 
((The Court finds that the plaintiff presented to the 
defendant conventional or personal notes for shares 
issued or to be issued equal or the principal amount of 
$32,961.71. Said notes are tabulated in Column 5 of 
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Schedule I attached hereto. Said notes were accepted 
by the defendant company as its assets; said notes satis-
fied the requirements of the contract and satisfied the 
requirements of the Insurance Code; all of said notes 
were in negotiable form and said notes were interest-
bearing or income-bearing, were not in default at the 
time they were presented and accepted by the defendant 
company, and the defendant was entitled to receive 
for its exclusive account the benefit of the interest or 
income accruing therefrom. At no time did defendant 
attempt to sell or discount to any bank or other person 
any of said notes." (Para. 6, R. 41.) 
Appellant does not complain that the Finding is not sup-
ported by the evidence. However, in view of the fact that 
the appellant asserts that cancellation of the obligations evi-
denced by these instruments did not constitute a breach of 
duty to plaintiff, it is necessary to explain to the court the 
facts with respect to them. 
On June 22 , 195 3, the accounting firm of Birrell, McGee, 
Zimmerman and Thomas wrote a letter to the defendant com-
pany following a study of the defendant's corporate records 
with respect to the assets which the defendant had at that 
time. The letter is in evidence as part of Exhibit 19. It refers 
to certain assets of the company as Hpersonal notes" in the 
amount of $32,961.71. The accountant's letter was transmitted 
by the defendant to the insurance commission as an {{audit" 
and the requests \Yere n1ade that the commission issue de-
fendant a license to do business as a stock insurer, and that 
the con1missioner authorize the release of the cash on deposit 
at the lJtah Savings and Trust Company (Ex. 19). The de-
fendant here, in its ans\ver to plaintiff's interrogatories, stated 
that the nan1es of the n1akers of the notes and the amount 
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thereof referred to in said letter with respect to the item 
~~personal notes other than subscription notes" are the names 
and amounts contained in plaintiff's Schedule I, (R. 49-57) 
Column 5. (Defendant's answer to plaintiff's interrogatories 
number 2 (f) R. 21). Defendant's witness, McGee, admitted 
that these same negotiable notes that were represented by 
the defendant to the insurance commissioner as assets of the 
company in June, 1953 (Ex. 19) were reclassified by him to 
{{notes cancelled," and that said notes were in fact cancelled 
by the defendant (R. 299-306, and see his work sheet received 
as Ex. 42, R. 306, showing these notes to be the same ones 
referred to in defendant's letter to the insurance commissioner.) 
The question is whether defendant violated any duty to plain-
tiff when it voluntarily discharged the obligations described 
in these notes and released the makers from liability thereon. 
( 1) The notes were accepted by the com pay as its assets. 
Cleo H. Bullard, the president of the company at the time 
of the filing of the June 22 letter with the State Insurance 
Commissioner, testified that the Board, acting as a Board, 
tnade such investigation of the assets referred to in the letter 
as they deemed necessary acting in a fiduciary capacity (R. 121, 
122). They specifically made such examination as to the per-
sonal notes (R. 123). They examined the form of the note 
and satified themselves that the maker could pay according 
to its terms (R. 123). Members of the Board, of course, knew 
that the notes were negotiable in form. (Ex. 16 is the form of 
note identified by Mr. Bullard.) The Board also knew that 
unless the company had assets equal in amount to $200,000.00, 
it could not obtain the money placed in escrow with the U tab 
Savings and Trust Company under the terms of the agree-
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ment which the defendant had with that company concerning 
its qualification to do business as a stock insurance company. 
(See the letter of the president of the company to the insur-
ance commissioner of June 22, 1953, part of Ex. 19.) The 
defendant's June 22, 195 3 letter to the insurance commissioner 
was an express representation that the defendant had the 
assets referred to, and no other interpretation is possible than 
that it had accepted the notes. The notes were carried on 
defendant's books as assets until they_ were cancelled. 
( 2) The notes satisfied the requirements of the insurance 
code and the contract. The trial court found and concluded 
expressly that these instruments satisfied the requirements of 
the contract (Ex. 13, paragraph 4) and were securities eligible 
for investment by insurers. Under the code, securities are 
eligible which are ( 1) interest bearing or income producing, 
( 2) not in default, and ( 3) the insurer is entitled to receive 
for its exclusive account and benefit the interest or income 
therefrom (Sec. 31-13-2 U.C.A. ( 1953)). In the trial court 
defendant vigorously disputed whether the notes were income 
bearing and plaintiff 'vas required to demonstrate to Judge 
Larson from defendant's own records that each of these re-
quirements was satisfied. Plaintiff could make the same demon-
stration here but it does not appear to be required since ap-
pellant concedes that the Findings and Conclusions are sup-
ported. 
Comn1issions were payable on these notes when defendant 
a((cpted then1. It is to be observed, parenthetically, that the 
key \vord in Section .11-6-7 U.C.A. 1953 is ttfunds" and not 
"cash.'' That is, the litnitation is upon nfundsn ... as and 
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when actually received." The word funds is derived from the 
Latin word ((fundus" and means ((bottom" or ((ground" and is 
not the equivalent of the word t(cash." A fund is a deposit 
or accumulation of resources. Webster's Unabridged Diction-
ary 1949. In re SevinanzPs Estate (Sup. Ct. Nev. 1948) 190 
P.(2d) 842 at 848. It includes choses in action as well as cash. 
Dickson v. Commonwealth Trust Co. of Pittsburgh, 65 Atl. 
( 2d) 408, 409, 361 Pa. 612. It includes notes, bonds and, in 
a broad sense, property of every kind. State v. Finney (Kan. 
1935) 40 P.(2d) 411 at 421. 
That these notes were actually (funds" and were 
ceived" by defendant cannot be disputed. 
( t 
re-
Since the assets satisfy the requirement of the insurance 
code, the commissions were payable when they were accepted 
and the trial court was more than generous to the defendant 
to allow interest from the date of the expiration of the contract. 
Clear! y the arbitrary reclassification of these assets to 
subscription notes and cancellation thereof without any reason-
able efforts toward their collection as found by the trial court 
(Findings of Fact, R. 42, and such finding is not disputed 
here) was a clear violation of defendant's duty to plaintiff 
(see authorities in Point I (A) of this brief). 
C. Commissions were payable on real estate contracts and 
mortgages accepted by defendant. 
Column 7 of Schedule I (R. 49-57) contains a tabulation 
of real estate mortgages and contracts upon which plaintiff 
is entitled to commissions. While appellant claims in its brief 
at page 7 that commissions were paid on such transactions, 
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it has already been demonstrated that that statement is not 
true. Defendant's statements undoubtedly constitute a judicial 
admission that commissions are payable on these transactions. 
Nevertheless, it is important for the court to know the facts 
concerning them. 
The arguments made in Point I (B) are applicable to a 
large extent in the same manner to said instruments. De-
fendant's letter to the insurance commissioner of June 22, 1953 
reported that defendant had received real estate contracts. and 
mortgages in the amount of $30,380.00 at that time (Ex. 19). 
The particular real estate contracts and mortgages referred 
to were identified by defendant in its answer to plaintiff's 
interrogatory 3 (b) (R. 23). In June 1953, prior to the June 
22 letter, the board of defendant company, acting as a board, 
considered the form of the contracts and the financial status 
of the obligor thereon. The members of the board satisfied 
themselves that the instruments were in the possession of the 
company; that the obligors could pay according to the terms 
of the instruments (R. 122, 123). It is undisputed that the 
defendant reported to the insurance commissioner that it had 
acquired said assets and that the insurance commissioner ac-
cepted the same at the time he authorized the withdrawal of 
the escrowed cash at Utah Savings and Trust Con1pany (Ex. 
19) . Mr. Bullard and Mr. McGee both testified that these 
transactions involved first mortgages and purchase contracts 
on real property and that the real estate contracts ·were dis-
counted in accordance \Yith the practice of discounting equities 
thereon. There is nothing in the record in this case to indicate 
or sugt1est in any manner that these contracts and instruments ( ,...., 
could not have been negotiated or sold to other banks or 
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business institutions at the full value for which they were 
accepted by the company, and the defendant admitted its 
liability for commissions on these transactions by paying com-
missions on many transactions of this kind (Ex. 31) . 
At the time of the cancellation of the other instruments 
involved in the lawsuit, defendant reclassified the unpaid 
balances on all of these mortgages and contracts as ((subscrip-
tion notes" and they were cancelled. (See testimony of Robert 
L. McGee, R. 299-306). Comparison of McGee's working 
sheet, Ex. 42 and Exhibit 39, Schedule A, demonstrates 
conclusive! y that many of the very transactions represented to 
the insurance commission as being secured by real property 
in June were arbitrarily cancelled the next February or March. 
Schedule 5 of Ex. 31, which exhibit was prepared and 
offered by defendant, admits that defendant cancelled real 
estate contract balances in an amount of approximately 
$34,000.00. 
The court found as follows concerning the real estate mort-
gages and contracts: 
n8. The defendant company received and accepted 
real estate mortgages and real estate ocntracts for stock 
issued or to be issued during said period of time of the 
value of $41,180.00. Said amount takes into account 
the discounts on said real estate mortgages and contracts 
and said amount is the sum for which the defendant 
agreed to issue certain shares of capital stock as reflected 
in the aforementioned Schedule I. Said real estate mort-
gages and contracts are tabulated in Column 7 of 
Schedule I attached hereto. Said real estate mortgages 
and contracts were interest bearing or income bearing, 
not in default on the dates they were accepted by the 
2,.. t) 
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defendant company and the defendant was entitled to 
receive for its exclusive account the benefit of interest 
or income accruing therefrom. At no time did defendant 
attempt to sell or discount any of said contracts or mort-
gages to any bank or any other person." (R. 41). 
Said Fin ding is not challenged by appellant in this court. 
Certainly it must be apparent that commissions are payable 
on the transactions in this category. They satisfied the contract-
commisisons were payable at the time of the transaction; de-
fendant admitted liability by paying commissions on many of 
the transactions of this character. They satisfied the require-
ments of the code and of the contract, and even if they had 
not satisfied such requirements, defendant violated its duty 
to plaintiff by cancelling the secured obligations and failing 
to enforce their provisions. 
It is further clear that the appellant attempts to mislead 
this court when it states on page 7 of its brief that commis-
sions were paid on the real estate and first mortgage trans-
actions. Defendant's obvious liability for commissions on these 
transactions, and its admission of such liability here, should 
be considered in connection with Point II of this brief. 
D. Com11lissions are payable on subscription notes accepted 
by defendant. 
We con1e now to the so-called subscription notes. The 
appellant would have this court believe that all of the obliga-
tions which \\'ere cancelled in January and February fell into 
this catc,~ory. The trial court found, however, and it is not 
disputed on this appeal, that at the time of their cancellation 
the arnount due on the subscription notes \vas $59,008.43 
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(Finding No. 9, R. 42). Commissions were payable on 
$152,280.00 (Finding No. 16, R. 45). As found by the trial 
court ((said subscription notes were distinguishable from the 
convention notes in that they contained a provision to the effect 
that the only remedy on the instrument in the event of default 
was to retain the amounts paid as liquidated damages" (R. 42). 
In other words it is not true that the defendant could simply 
cancel the subscription notes and issue stock therefor. There 
was a kind of security in the instrument. If the note was not 
paid the remedy of the payee was that it could retain the 
amounts paid as liquidated damages. The defendant did not 
enforce this provision. Instead, the defendant cancelled the 
obligations of the makers of the instruments to pay the balance, 
in tacit consideration of the maker's acceptance of stock in 
an amount equal to the payments made by the maker at $20.00 
per share. 
Defendant, in effect, ((bought off" the purchasers by issu-
ing stock for the amounts paid, advising the purchasers their 
contracts were ((cancelled" so that stock could be sold to other 
persons, and not suggesting in any manner whatever that the 
forfeiture provisions would be invoked. Note the similarity 
between defendant's actions here and those of the sellers in 
Reid v. Life Ins. Co., (1900) 21 Ut. 295, 61 Pac. 21 (Point 
IA, supra), and Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, Inc., (1953) 1 Ut. 
(2d) 9, 261 P.(2d) 927, (Point II, infra.) 
Analysis of the so-called subscription notes demonstrates 
the importance of defendant's failure to enforce the forfeiture 
provisions and demonstrates defendant's lack of good faith 
toward plaintiff and complete disregard of plaintiff's rights 
in cancellation of the instruments. 
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( 1) Enforcement of subscription notes according to their 
terms would have required forfeiture or enforced payment in 
approximately 90%, money-wise, of the instances involved. 
In the trial court plaintiff prepared a schedule from the 
defendant's own records analyzing the so-called ((subscription 
notes" which are itemized in Schedule I (R. 49-57) attached 
to the Findings and Conclusions. The schedule was not re-
ceived as an exhibit, as such, but in argument to the court. 
Defendant did not contest the accuracy of said analysis below, 
and cannot here. The figures contained in this section of the 
brief are verifiable primarily from Exhibits 23 and 31. If 
appellant should deny their accuracy, respondent can reproduce 
the schedule used below and substantiate it from the record. 
The total of the instances where no payment was made 
is $9,010.00. In other words, some payment was made on notes 
totalling $82,636.08, or more than 90% in amount of the 
total. In more than 90% of the instances, if defendant had 
enforced the provisions of the note to the effect that failure to 
pay would result in forfeiture of the amount paid, a forfeiture 
of the amount paid, a forfeiture would have resulted, or de-
fendant would have collected the balance. 
A total of $32,63 7.65 \Yas received. In other words ap-
proxirnately 36~;h of the total amounts of these notes was 
actually paid to the company not,vithstanding defendant's 
failure to attempt to enforce the notes. Yet defendant issued 
stock for ~•ll amounts paid and cancelled the balances rather 
than enforcing the provisions. 
It is interesting to observe how defendant reverses its 
28 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
field in discussing the public policy considerations in Points 
I(A) and I(B) of its brief. In Point I(A) it argues that to pay 
more than 15% commissions would reduce the assets of the 
defendant and thereby injure the rights of stockholders and 
policyholders. But in Point II (B) it argues in effect that the 
defendant was justified in cancelling the obligations of stock 
purchasers to pay into the company approximately $150,000.00. 
It says in effect that to enforce the obligations of subscribers 
would hurt the company because it might be more than two 
years before company received all the assets subscribers agreed 
to pay into it (Appellant's brief, p. 12). Here indeed is a 
specious argument. Certainly the company had an obligation 
both to its policyholders and stockholders to protect its assets. 
That corporation assets constitute a trust fund for creditors 
and stockholders is known to any first year law student. De-
fendant had an obligation, if any of its assets were technically 
inadmissible under the insurance code, to take reasonable 
action to convert such inadmissible assets to admissible ones. 
The defendant has never suggested yet in this lawsuit how the 
cancellation of the obligations of the makers of subscription 
notes discharged that duty. The only way the company could 
have received the cash which the obligors agreed to pay into 
the company was to enforce the forfeiture provisions of these 
notes. Their cancellation therefore constituted a violation of 
duty the company owed to stockholders and policyholders of 
the mutual company just as it constituted a violation of the duty 
that defendant owed to the plaintiff. 
The authorities cited in Point 1-A of this brief are ap-
plicable in full measure to the subscription note transactions. 
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Moreover, the obligations of these persons was cancelled 
by the defendant in bad faith insofar as the plaintiff was con-
cerned. (See argument made in Point II of this brief.) It ~ 
submitted that the Findings and Conclusions of the trial court 
concerning the subscription notes are sufficient, accurate and 
correct. The defendant's arguments to excuse their admitted 
cancellation are inconsistent and specious. The trial court's 
rulings to the effect that commissions are payable, especially 
in view of the supporting and supplementary reasons discussed 
in Point II of this brief, should be affirmed. 
( 2) That the subscription notes may have been inadmis-
sible assets under the insurance code neither prevents their 
enforcement nor justifies their cancellation. 
The trial court found that the provisions of the subscription 
notes to the effect that in the event of default the remedy 
of the company to retain the amounts paid as liquidated 
damages "was for the benefit of the subscribers or purchasers 
of the stock in the defendant company and not for the benefit 
of the defendant company. Such terms and conditions are not 
self -executing. They did not prevent or excuse the defendant 
from making reasonable effort to ·collect the various instru-
ments or from enforcing the subscription notes according to 
the terms and tenor thereof . . . (they) do not constitute any 
valid or legal excuse for defendant's violation of its duty to 
plaintiff to attempt in good faith to collect all of said sub· 
scription notes, (R. 43) . 
It should be noted that the limitation upon the liability 
of the 1nakers of these notes is of very questionable validity. 
Subscribers to corporate stock in this state have been held 
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liable to creditors of the corporation for the full amount of 
the subscription under Article XII, Sec. 5 of the Constitution. 
Rolapp v. Ogden & N.W.R.R. Co. (1910) 37 Ut. 540, 110 
P. 364. The makers of these notes all signed subscription 
agreements in the full amount of the note (R. 171, 172. The 
subscription contracts still in defendant's file were produced 
and received as Exhibit 17) . Whether there can be any valid 
contractural, regulatory or even statutory limitations upon the 
constitutional liability is open to question. 
The point is that the corporation made no reasonable 
effort to collect from subscribers. It failed to enforce the for-
feiture provisions of these subscription notes. It failed to make 
the 45-day demand which it now argues should have been 
given (Appellant's brief, pp. 12 ,13, citing 31-6-14 UCA, 
195 3). It failed to assert any legal position which reasonable 
collection effort would have dictated. It, in effect, ((bought 
off" the purchasers by issuing stock in the amount paid for 
in cash rather than enforcing the provision of the subscription 
note. And, of course, it concedes here, in effect, that cancella-
tion or these notes was in bad faith toward plaintiff (See Point 
II of this brief). 
Appellant appears to take comfort in the code provision 
/ to the effect that a solicitation permit would expire in two 
: years (Appellant's brief, pp. 12, 13). How that provision 
I' helps it out is far from clear. In the first place defendant 
didn't get a solicitation permit (Ex. 4). In the second place, 
it has nothing to do with defendant's violation of its duty to 
plaintiff, and in the third place, nobody has ever claimed in 
this lawsuit that defendant was liable for commissions on 
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transactions dated two years after the date of plaintiff's con-
tract (the period covered by Schedule I, Appendix A is 18 
months) or even two years from the date of the sale of stock 
by defendant. Even if such permit had been obtained and had 
expired, the obligations of subscribers would not have expired. 
Appellant's arguments in Point I-B of its brief simply do 
not go to the roots of the matter. They are certainly no answer 
to the trial court's Findings and Conclusions. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ON ALL THE 
STOCK TRANSACTIONS INVOLVED BECAUSE THE 
DEFENDANT'S CANCELLATION OF THE OBLIGA-
TIONS TO PAY FOR ITS STOCK WAS NOT IN GOOD 
FAITH. 
This court has held in a long series of cases that a broker 
is entitled to a commission on a sale where he has procurred 
a written, binding offer or agreenzent signed by a ready, willing 
and able purchaser. See, for example, Curtis z·. 1\lortenson 
(1954) 1 Utah (2d) 354,267 P.(2d) 237; Ogden Savings Bank 
8(. Trust Co. v. Blakely ( 1925) 66 Utah 229, 241 P. 221; Little 
and Little v. Freishman, ( 1909) 35 Utah 566, 101 P. 984; 
Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes,. (1953) 1 Utah (2d) 9, 261 P.(2d) 
927. 
It is settled in this state that the comn1ission is earned 
when the broker produces the offer to purchase~ that the 
buyer's default thereafter 1s no defense to a broker's claim 
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against the seller. Ogden Savings and Trust Co. v. Blakely 
et al. ( 1925) 66 Utah 229, 241 P. 221. 
And it is clear that where a principal terminates the em-
ployment contract in bad faith, the agent is entitled to recover. 
2 Restatement on Agency, Sec. 454, is as follows: 
CCAn agent to whom the principal has made a revoc-
able offer of compensation if he accomplishes a speci-
fied result is entitled to the promised amount if the 
principal, in order to avoid payment of it, revokes the 
offer and thereafter the result is accomplished, the 
agent's prior efforts being the effective cause thereof." 
Illustrations 1 and 2 to the Sections are as follows: 
( c 1. P lists Blackacre with A for sale. A introduces T, 
who agrees to meet T' s terms, except as to one or two 
minor matters, agreeing to thing it over until the next 
day. P telephones A that he is dismissed and the deal 
is off, but the next day seeks T, who agrees to the terms 
which P had required the day before. It may be found 
that P has terminated A's employment in bad faith and 
that A is entitled to his commission. 
2. P lists Blackacre with A, a broker, for sale. A 
advertises, and several persons apparently desirous of 
purchasing respond. P immediately telephones A that 
his services are no longer required, intending to effect 
a sale personally with one of such persons and com-
plete the transaction. Two days later, P effects a sale 
to one of the persons who responded to A's advertise-
ments. It may be found that P terminated his relations 
with A in bad faith and that A is entitled to his con1-
., 
mtSSlOllS. 
This principle is applicable where the cancellation occurred 
before a contract was entered into between the seller and 
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purchaser. A fortiori} it is applicable where the cancellation 
occurred after an agreement was made between the seller and 
purchaser. 
The trial court found that: ((The circumstances surround-
ing the cancellation of the various obligations to pay defendant 
for the stock, said obligations being cancelled in the months 
of February and March, 1954 compel the Court to find specific-
ally that the said cancellations were not in good faith toward 
plaintiff and that said cancellations were made in bad faith 
so that the principle stated by the Restatement on Agency, 
Volume 2, Section 454 is applicable." (R. 44, para. 13). 
The conclusion of law on the same theory is: ((Plaintiff 
is entitled to commissions on the unpaid balances due to de-
fendant under the obligations described in Schedule I with 
respect to personal or conventional type ~otes, real estate con-
tracts and mortgages and subscription notes, whether said 
instruments and obligations satisfied the requirements of the 
contract between the parties or the Insurance Code because the 
defendant failed to act in good faith toward plaintiff in can-
celling all of said obligations." (R. 46, para. 4.) 
These Findings and Conclusions are not challenged bere. 
The facts are directly within the rule and illustrations. 
In 32 different instances} defendant issued stock to persons 
and received payments therefor after the obligations from 
these persons to pay for their stock were purportedly cancelled 
by defendant. (Compare the cancellations, Schedule I, R. 49-
57 with defendant's stock book and defendant's tabulation of 
proxies at the stockholders' meeting May 10, 1954, Ex. 48.) 
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These instances are directly within the rule stated in Section 
454 of the Restatement, and they are important to further 
demonstrate defendant's unconscionable lack of good faith in 
cancelling all the securities in question. 
For the most part the very obligations that were repre-
sented to the Insurance Commissioner on June 22, 195 3, as 
being proper assets in all respects for investment by the de-
fendant were cancelled in February and March, 1954. Defendant 
gave no consideration as to whether the obligation was secured 
or unsecured and no attempt whatever was made to sell the 
securities to a bank or any other person. 
Forfeiture provisions of the so-called stock notes were entirely 
disregarded. The negotiable instruments were treated the same 
as non-negotiable notes. Plaintiff was given no opportunity 
to enforce the instruments. Among the obligors whose promises 
to pay were arbitrarily cancelled were attorneys, practicing 
physicians, well-known real estate brokers and other highly 
respected business people of the state. The only documents 
in evidence with respect to defendant's enforcement of the 
terms of the notes and other evidence of indebtedness are in 
Exhibit 29. Defendant stipulated that these were the only 
demands for payment or notices pertaining to defendant of 
which defendant had copies (R. 152, 153). They do not 
request payment in any form whatever. They simply announce 
that the stock transaction is cancelled and that defendant's 
stock is issued for the amount paid. It is hardly coincidental 
that the cancellation of these securities and obligations occurred 
at the time when a proxy battle was pending concerning the 
control of the Board of Directors of defendant company (R. 
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309). Obviously, purchasers of stock whose obligations were 
cancelled would have played a major role in that proxy con-
test. 
It is little wonder that the defendant does not challenge 
the sufficiency of the court's findings and conclusions that the 
cancellation of the obligations to pay for defendant's stock 
was not in good faith. 
Factors involved in this point must be considered in con-
nection with the principles discussed in Point I of this brief. 
Even if it be admitted that the so-called stock notes were not 
assets which qualified under the Insurance Code as eligible by 
insurance companies, it can hardly be doubted that they are 
bona fide offers to purchase stock. In 32 different instances 
defendant issued stock to persons and received payment there-
for after cancelling the stock notes only approximately 60 
days prior thereto. 
With respect to failure to enforce the forfeiture provision 
of the so-called stock notes, the court's attention is invited to 
Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, Inc. (1953) 1 Utah (2d) 9, 261 P. 
(2d) 927. There the plaintiff brought an action to recover 
money defendant had retained from the commission for arrang-
ing real estate transactions on property o"rned by plaintiff and 
defendant filed a counterclaim for a real estate commission. 
$1,000.00 had been deposited as earnest n1oney pursuant to 
the provisions of an ordinary earnest n1oney receipt which 
provided that the Seller could retain the deposit as liquidated 
damages. After the earnest tnoney receipt was signed the 
Sellers changed their minds and declined to proceed. The 
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$1,000.00 deposited by the Buyers was being held by the de-
fendant. The court held that the broker was entitled to his 
commission because the Seller had defaulted and that the 
broker had a right to look to the Seller to enforce the liquidated 
damage provision of the agreement. Failure to enforce said 
provisions would have rendered the Seller liable for wilful 
failure to complete the contract. 
A fortiori Section 454, supra, is applicable where the Seller 
makes a direct deal with the Buyer after failing to enforce the 
forfeiture provisions. 
The argument made on this point is a complete and direct 
answer to Point I (b) in defendant's brief. Plaintiff is entitled 
to his commissions based on defendant's lack of good faith in 
terminating the obligations. Certain! y when the additional 
arguments considered in Point I are added to the force of the 
arguments in this point and it is realized that the defendant 
does not dispute Fin dings of the trial court with respect to its 
lack of good faith, it is obvious that the decision of the trial 
court allowing commissions upon all the transactions in 
Schedule I (R. 49-57) should be affirmed. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
STRIKING CERTAIN TESTIMONY CONCERNING AD-
MINISTRATIVE EXPENSES OF DEFENDANT AND DE-
NYING DEFENDANT'S OFFER WITH RESPECT THERE-
TO. 
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Defendant contends that the trial court committed error 
in striking certain testimony concerning the defendant's claim 
that certain of its administrative expenses such as stenographic 
and office equipment were chargeable against the plaintiff 
under the agreement. Defendant assumes in its argument 
that such testimony was relevant and that proper offers of proof 
thereof were made. Neither assumption is accurate. 
A. The stricken testimony concerned general administra-
tive expenses, not rrpromotion and organization~~ expenses. 
During the period when Mr. McCormick was selling 
stock for the defendant company, the defendant charged the 
plaintiff with all the ordinary usual expenses incident to stock 
sales. Included was such items as filing fees for the registration 
of the sale with the state Securities Commission, the expenses 
incident to the obtaining of the licenses for salesmen's com-
missions, advances made to salesmen on any such sales and 
similar items of that kind (R. 361-368) . The defendant at the 
trial attempted to introduce evidence on the theory that the 
defendant's nestimate" of the amount of office space and 
stenographic and other office help and services used by de-
fendant was and should be charged to plaintiff. Upon comple-
tion of the testimony of the president of the defendant cor-
poration on these matters, a motion was made to strike the 
same on the ground that it was incompetent, irrelevant and 
immaterial and represented conclusions of the witness, that 
no proper foundation was laid and that it was remote insofar 
as the issues of the lawsuit are concerned (R. 357). 
'fhe court interrogated counsel on both sides in some detail 
as to the items clain1ed by the various parties \vith respect to 
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such indirect costs involved in the testimony (R. 361-368). 
It was clearly apparent that the offered testimony and the 
stricken testimony of Mr. Bullard was to support defendant's 
theory with respect to items such as rent, secretarial service 
and office expenses. The court then made the following order: 
((THE COURT: Just before adjournment last night, 
the plaintiff made a motion to strike from the record 
all the testimony of the witness, Bullard, received yes-
terday afternoon, with respect to the matter of rents, 
secretarial service and office expenses, and that motion 
is granted, and the testimony of· Bullard with respect 
thereto stricken from the record. 
(t * * * I don't concede that the law would 
say, and, if it attempted to, I don't think the law 
would have any constitutional validity if it were to 
be construed as saying that a company, desiring to 
sell stock, could employ the salesmen at a lawful com-
mission to sell that stock, and then be heard to say that, 
(We as a company are only allowed to expend fifteen 
per cent of the receipts in promotion and those things, 
and, in the manipulation of our business, we actually 
expended fifteen per cent over and above the agents' 
commission, and, therefore, the agent has nothing com-
ing to him. We could deprive him of his commission 
entirely by spending that much, fifteen per cent of 
money on other things that we manipulate with respect 
to organization.' 
((I don't think the law contemplated that any such 
-any such construction could be put on the statute. 
If it did, I think it would be definitely and clearly un-
constitutional and void.'' 
The ruling of the trial court was not only proper but it 
was well considered and clearly reflected the law on the subject. 
The testimony stricken concerned ordinary administrative ex-
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penses of the defendant company. There was not one word of 
evidence to the effect that one single employee was added as 
a result of the stock sales program. Moreover the position of 
the defendant contemplates that defendant itself could have 
expended more than 15% which defendant claims was the 
amount allowed by the code for the promotion and organiza-
tion expenses for administrative expense unconnected with 
its stock program and then deny to McCormick the fruits of 
his labor. Certainly the Insurance Code contemplated no such 
interpretation. It is respectfully submitted that the ruling of 
Judge Larson on this point was in no way prejudicial to any 
proper interests of the defendant in the lawsuit. 
The only authority counsel has been able to find was in the 
Bureau of Tax Appeals. Under Section 280 of the Revenue Act 
of 1926, organization expense of a corporation was deductible 
upon dissolution. 
In James Van Keuren v. Com. of Int. Rev., (1933) 28 
B. T .A. 480, it was held that expenses for salaries, rent, ad-
vertising, telephone and telegraph did not constitute ({organi-
zation" expense. 
Appellant's authorities are not in point. None of them 
hold or even infer that a share of the general administrative 
expenses are to be considered as norganization and promotion" 
expenses. 
B. T be st-ricken testinzony is so indefinite, uncertain and 
speculative on the points for which it was claimed by the de-
fendant as to be inadmissible. 
Even assun1ing for the purpose of argument that a proper 
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division of administrative expenses would be chargeable to the 
plaintiff (a wholly gratuitous assumption) the evidence in-
troduced was entirely improper to accomplish the purpose. It 
was speculative and represented pure guesswork. No proper 
foundation was laid for it and it was so remote and indefinite 
as to be unworthy of judicial consideration. With respect to 
secretarial assistance, for example, the question and answer 
was as follows: 
t(Q. Can you state how much secretarial assistance was 
devoted to Mr. McCormick, or provided? 
((A. On secretarial service alone, it would be hard to 
give an exact figure." (R. 344.) 
With respect to office facilities generally the following ques-
tion and answer appear in the record. 
ttQ. Now directing your attention to the use of office 
facilities, was there any-was any part of the rest 
of the office facilities of the company devoted or 
used in the handling of stock transactions and 
the promotion and organization of the stock com-
pany? 
ttA. Yes. 
ttQ. Do you recall approximately-or do you recall 
how much that was? 
((A. Not in exact detail, no." (R. 346.) 
He then testified that the printing department was used ttquite 
a little bit on and off.'' 
Mr. Bullard admitted that as far as rent was concerned 
that the insurance salesmen used the same space which plaintiff 
v1as using and Mr. McCorm.ick was not furnished space that 
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was exclusively devoted to the sale and promotion of stock 
(R. 347). . 
He could not even make an approximate guess as to the 
legal fees incurred by the company which he claimed should 
be allocated to the organization and promotion (R. 347, 348). 
As to all of these matters he testified that the general books 
of the corportaion reflect the exact figures (R. 348) but at no 
time did the defendant company offer these general corporate 
records in evidence. 
A finding cannot be based upon conjecture, guess or specu-
lation. Dern Investment Co. v. Carbon Co. Land Co.) ( 1938) 
94 Ut. 76, 75 P(2d) 660; Higley v. Ind. Comm. et al.J (1930) 
75 Ut. 361, 285 P. 306. 
C. Defendant· cannot recover from plaintiff any amount 
paid in excess of the amount provided by the statute. 
Defendant argues in Point I-A and by inference through 
Point I of its entire brief that it was entitled to recover the 
difference between the 15% allowable under Section 31-6-7 
U.C.A. 1953 and the 20% which defendant paid (including 
all proper credits) to plaintiff. It argues that the evidence to 
establish a 5% or any additional amount erroneously paid was 
wrongfully rejected. 
Vol. II, Section 598 of the Restatement on Contracts pro-
vides in substance that an amount paid in violation of a statute 
cannot be recovered by a party except under the conditions 
referred to in Sections 599 through 609, none of which is 
applicable to the defendant in this lawsuit. 
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The rule is so widely accepted as to not require citation 
of additional authorities. Not being an innocent party and 
having itself, according to its own theory, failed to comply 
with the statute, the defendant is in no position to ask the 
court for relief. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING TO McCORMICK 
COMMISSIONS ON THE STOCK TRANSACTIONS IN-
VOLVED AT THE RATE OF 20% AS PROVIDED BY THE 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
The Restatement of the Law on Contracts, Vol. II, Sec. 
599, is as follows: 
((Where the illegality of a bargain is due to 
(( (a) facts of which one party is justifiably ignor-
:tnt and the other party is not, or 
(((b) statutory or executive regulations of a minor 
character relating to a particular business which 
are unknown to one party, who is justified in 
assuming special knowledge by the other party 
of the requirements of the law, 
the illegality does not preclude recovery by the ignorant 
party of compensation for any performance rendered 
while he is still justifiably ignorant, or for losses in-
curred or gains prevented by non-performance of the 
bargain.'' 
Illustration 3 under the Section (page 1114) is very close to 
the case at bar. 
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See also Volume II, Section 604, Restatement of Contracts, 
as follows: 
((Where the parties to an illegal bargain, though 
both blameworthy, are not in pari delicto, and one of 
them has not been guilty of serious moral turpitude, 
he can repudiate the bargain, and if he has rendered 
any performance thereunder, recover it or its value." 
The facts of this case are squarely within the principles 
announced in the said sections. Prior to September, 1952, the 
plaintiff, M. J. McCormick, had never had any occasion to 
examine the laws of the state of Utah with respect to insurance 
matters (R. 235). He has never had any legal training (R. 235). 
He had very limited experience prior to that time in connection 
with the organization of any life insurance company (R. 236). 
He has never had any occasion to look into the laws of the 
state of Utah for any rulings of the Insurance Commissioner 
\vith respect to any requirement incident to the issuance of 
the solicitation permit (R. 236). Prior to and incident to the 
execution of the agreement between the parties, Mr. McCormick 
had conversations with three directors and officers of the 
defendant company. Mr. Ashby Thatcher was represented to 
him as being an authority on insurance and an examiner for 
the Insurance Commissioner in Utah for several years (R. 238). 
Mr. Thatcher himself represented that he was executive vice 
president of the defendant company and a director and that 
he was instrumental in organizing the company and seeing that 
it was a success. He further represented that he had been 
an exan1iner for the Insurance Commissioner in Utah for a 
nun1ber of years and for some other states (R. 238). Mr. 
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Thatcher represented explicitly that the defendant company 
could pay plaintiff commissions at the rate of 20% (R. 239). 
Mr. Cleo Bullard was introduced to the plaintiff as presi-
dent of the defendant and he stated that he had a great amount 
of experience in insurance matters and had made a ttgreat study 
with reference to the insurance business" (R. 240). He told 
Mr. McCormick that Harry Pugsley was one of the outstand-
ing attorneys in Utah formerly connected with the Attorney 
General's office and ttwas very competent as an insurance 
attorney." Mr. Bullard represented to Mr. McCormick that 
he could be paid 20% commissions (R. 241). Harry Pugsley 
represented to plaintiff that he was an attorney from Salt Lake 
City representing the defendant company, that he had formerly 
been connected with the .A.ttorney General's office and tthad 
a vast amount of experience as an insurance attorney" (R. 242). 
Mr. Pugsley drafted the contract and presented it to plaintiff 
(R. 243). Mr. McCormick relied on the statements of Mr. 
Thatcher, Mr. Bullard and Mr. Pugsley that the company 
could and would pay 20% commissions (R. 243). 
The defendant itself held out these officers and directors 
to be men of experience and training in the insurance business. 
Exhibit 11 is an offering circular which defendant produced 
from its own files and of which a copy was filed with the 
Securities Commission of the state of Utah. It states that its 
president, Cleo H. Bullard, has had many years of executive 
experience in the insurance business in the states of Arizona, 
Nevada, Utah and Colorado. The exhibit states: ttHis experi-
ence is vvorking closely wth the state insurance departments of 
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the Western States has been invaluable in the progress of the 
Life Insurance Corporation of America." 
Ashby S. Thatcher, the vice president of the company, is 
described as C(a man widely recognized in the insurance field. 
For many years he was Chief Examiner for the Utah department 
of insurance. He has served many of the western states in a 
similar capacity.'' 
Harry D. Pugsley, a director and ((legal advisor" of the 
defendant, is described as a Salt Lake City attorney ccdevoting 
a rna jor portion of his practice to corporation, insurance . . . 
law." The other directors and officers of the corporation are 
similarly held out to have had experience in the insurance 
business (see Ex. 11) . The defendant's own records demon-
strate that defendant's officers and directors who prepared and 
executed the agreement between the parties were held out as 
being experienced persons with specialized knowledge concern-
ing the insurance business and the requirements of the Utah 
insurance department. 
It is clear, moreover, that the Utah State Securities Com-
mission itself issued its permit to sell the stock in question 
on the assumption that 20% commission was to be paid as 
commissions on defendant's stock (see Ex. 5, pg. 3 and see 
Ex. 7) . Exhibit 5, page 10, question 10 (a) states that the 
department of insurance, state of Utah, has passed upon the 
securities subject to the sale described in the application. Ex-
hibit 12, a letter to the Insurance Commissioner from the 
defendant company, dated June 17, 1953, represents that the 
application to the Insurance Con1missioner \vas filed upon the 
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advice of defendant's counsel, Harry D. Pugsley. In that letter 
Mr. Bullard states: C(I believe you will find all the legal steps 
in perfect order and that the entire program, from the begin-
ning, has been on a completely sound basis" (Ex. 18). It is to 
be observed that Peter M. Lowe, Deputy Attorney General 
of the state of Utah, similarly passed upon the legality of the 
issue (Ex. 21). 
At no time prior to his execution of the contract did Mr. 
McCormick ever inquire into the provisions of the Utah statute 
concerning commissions payable on the sale of insurance stock 
(R. 244). Mr. McCormick left San Francisco, came to Salt Lake 
City for the purpose of performing his contract with defendant 
(R. 245). 
Throughout the period of the sales referred to in Schedule 
I, all of the parties involved assumed that plaintiff was entitled 
to receive 20% of the amount of the sales commission and he 
was paid on this basis. The reasonableness of the assumption 
may well be compared to the policy of the Insurance Commis-
sioner himself to the effect that where companies were being 
converted from a mutual benefit to a stock company, compliance 
with the requirements of the Securities Code allowing 20% 
as commissions rather than the Insurance Code was the proper 
procedure (Ex. 5). Certainly the action taken by the Insurance 
Commissioner, the Securities Commissioner and the officers 
and directors of the defendant company themselves demonstrate 
that the plaintiff was reasonably ignorant of the requirements 
of the law. He was justified in assuming special knowledge by 
the defendant of these requirements and that the defendant 
had complied with them. 
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The court expressly found that the plaintiff substantially 
performed all of the provisions and promises contained in the 
agreement (R. 45, Finding 19). There is no suggestion in 
appellant's brief that such :finding is not amply supported by 
the evidence herein. 
It is respectfully submitted that the facts in this case fall 
squarely within Section 599 of the Restatement of the Law on 
Contracts and the general equitable principles applicable 
thereto. Plaintiff was ((reasonably ignorant" of a special statute. 
He relied upon the knowledge and experience of defendant's 
officers and directors who were acting within the scope of their 
authority. The plaintiff should have been allowed to recover at 
the rate of 15% rather than 20% on the amounts referred to 
in Schedule I. It is respectfully submitted that the Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment herein should be amended accord-
ingly. 
The only case cited by defendant in its brief, Anchor 
Life and Accident Insurance Co. v. Taylor, Ct. App. Ohio 
( 1928) 163 N.E. 631, is distinguishable from the principle 
announced by the Restatement in the following particulars: 
1. The plaintiff in that action was employed by a trustee 
of the defendant and not by the defendant company. 
2. There is no evidence in that case that the plaintiff 
relied on the special knowledge of the defendant in the execu-
tion of the agreement. 
3. It appears that in the Anchor Life case the contract 
\vas invalid as such under the terms of the statute. In the case 
at bar, Sec. 31-6-7, U.C.A. 19)3, does not prohibit contracts 
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of the kind in question. That section is only applicable with 
respect to the procedures to be followed in obtaining a solici-
tation permit. The sins of the defendant in this action, if indeed 
there be any in failin~ to comply with Section 31-6-7, should 
not be heaped upon the head of the plaintiff. 
Moreover, if the Anchor Life case is in conflict with the 
Restatement section, it is respectfully submitted that the Re-
statement rule more aptly and justly applies the equities in 
the situation. 
The argument in this point assumes that the trial court 
was correct in holding that a solicitation permit should have 
been obtained by defendant. If defendant and the Insurance 
Commissioner were correct in supposing that no such permit 
is required when a mutual company converts to a stock com-
pany, then, of course, Commisisons are recoverable at the 
20% rate without dispute. 
There is no dispute in this lawsuit that the plaintiff is 
entitled to recover on all transactions for which commissions 
are due in the amount of at least 15%, as found by the trial 
court. In the event the court agrees with respondent that the 
rate should be 20% under the authorities presented in this 
point, then the judgment should simply be increased from 
$22,842.00 plus interest and attorney's fees ( 15% of $152,280, 
the amount on which commissions remain unpaid, Finding 
16, R. 45) to $30,456.00 (20% of $152,280), plus interest 
and attorney's fees as computed and allowed by the trial court. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's violation of its duty to plaintiff renders it 
liable to him under the theories referred to in Points I and II. 
The only real question is whether he can recover at the rate of 
15% as' determined by the trial court, or at the 20% rate under 
the authorities presented in Point IV herein. In either event, 
no purpose would be served by a new trial since the facts pre-
sented in Point IV cannot be seriously controverted. 
The objections made by appellant are clearly without merit 
and should be rejected by this court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE M. McMILLAN 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent 
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